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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5803 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2 & 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA2
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2 & 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2F34
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-805
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5804 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2 & 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB2
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-2 & 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2 F33
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-806
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5805 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2FI8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-807
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5806 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A13A2F35
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-808
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5807 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BC2
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2F28
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-809
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5808 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BCl
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2F6
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BC14C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-810
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5809 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB2
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DE ORB I T: 3/ 3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2FI2
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-811
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5810 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS CA2
RI3A2 PANEL
FUSE, IA TO MMCA-4 & 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
L!FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2F31
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PLBM AC BUS. CRITICAL
LOADS HAVE DUAL POWER SOURCES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW
PAYLOAD DOORS TO CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES : 76BC14 B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-812
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5811 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A4CR1
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
B [ F] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-813
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5812 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) CONT BUS AB1
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2A4CRI
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-814
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5813 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A4CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BC14H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-815
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5814 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A4 CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND _AY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BC14H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-816
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B 
EPD&C
5815
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2A4CR3
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BC14F
REPORT DATE 33/31/87 C-817
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5816 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A4CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-818
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5817
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER _ SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CONT BUS CA2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2A4CR4
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-819
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5818 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CONT BUS CA2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2A4CR4
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-820
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5819 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONT BUS CA2
RI3A2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/1R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32 V73AI 3A2ASCR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-821
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5820
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI 3A2A5 CR4
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-822
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5821 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32 V73AI3A2A5CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-823
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5822 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS AB2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A5CR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-824
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5823
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2) R13A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AI 3A2A5CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-825
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5824 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS CA1
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2ASCR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-826
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5825 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2A5CRI
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD TIE TWO CONTROL BUSSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY
CAUSE THE FUSE TO BLOW. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES IN TWO MCAS. A THIRD FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM BUSSES WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO RENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-827
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5826
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) DIODE, ISOLATION 3A
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2A5CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
RELAYS THAT CONTROL THREE PHASE AC POWER TO THE PLBM BUSSES.
CRITICAL LOADS ARE SUPPLIED BY REDUNDANT PLBM BUSSES. THIRD
FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF TWO PLBM
BUSSES AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE DOORS PRIOR TO ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BCI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-828
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5827
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS i)
FAILS OPEN OR SHORTS TO CASE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUSSES ABI, AB2, CA1, CA2, BCI, & BC2
RI3A2 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2SI
ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC PWR TO P/L
LOADS. THE SECOND FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER TO CLOSE
P/L BAY DOORS AND/OR RETRACT FREON RADIATORS.
REFERENCES: 76BC13
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-829
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5828 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS 1)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUSSES ABI, AB2, CA1, CA2, BCI, & BC2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3A2SI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM THIS FAILURE AS THE SWITCH IS NORMALLY "ON".
REFERENCES: 76BC13
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-830
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5829
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUSSES ABI, AB2, CA1, CA2, BCI, & BC2
2) RI3A2 PANEL
3) SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS 2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2S2
ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM THIS FAILURE AS THE SWITCH IS NORMALLY "ON".
REFERENCES: 76BC13
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-831
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5830 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS 2)
FAILS OPEN OR SHORTS TO CASE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUSSES ABI, AB2, CA1, CA2, BCI, & BC2
RI3A2 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY MECH PWR SYS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3A2S2
ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC PWR TO P/L
LOADS. THE SECOND FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER TO CLOSE
P/L BAY DOORS AND/OR RETRACT FREON RADIATORS.
REFERENCES: 76BC13
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-832
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5831 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICBI
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-833
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5832 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER,
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
3A (AC CONT 1 A)
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICBI
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHSHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-834
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5833 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTtrRAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-835
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/II/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5834 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB2
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-836
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5835
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 C)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB3
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-837
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5836
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 1 C)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB3
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS
AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-838
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/s 
EPD&C
5837
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #i)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #I)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS 16
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS
AS THE AC INVERTERS ARE LATCHED ON DURING PRE-LAUNCH. ALTERNATE
MEANS OF REMOVING A PHASE FROM THE AC BUS EXIST.
REFERENCES: 76BF24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-839
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5838 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ia
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #1)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #i)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PARTNUMBER:
32V73AIAISI6
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURALFAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS TO THE "OFF" SIDE OF THE SWITCH, AT LEAST
ONE INVERTER WILL BE SHUT DOWN AND COULD NOT BE RESTARTED. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-840
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5839 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR4
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-841
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5840
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR4
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-842
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5841 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MNATO INV 1 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 8IV 76AI 6AR5
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-843
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5842 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MNATO INV 1 OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN A TO INV 1 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6AR5
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-844
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5843
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 A ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6ARII
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-845
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5844 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 A ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARII
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-846
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5845 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 B ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76AI 6ARI 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-847
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1 I/87 HI GHEST CRI TI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5846 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 B ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
8 iV 76AI 6ARI 2
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-848
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5847 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 C ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV i C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
AT O: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV 76AI 6ARI 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-849
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5848 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 C ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 1 C ON)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI3
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BFITA
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-850
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5849 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON: 8 IV 76AI 6ARI 4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-851
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5850 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 iV76AI6ARI4
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-852
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5851 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B ON)
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV 76AI 6ARI 5
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-853
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5852 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) o5- 
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI5
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY DEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-854
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31ZZlSV
EPD&C
5853
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV 76AI 6ARI 6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-855
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/II/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5854 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI6
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-856
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5855 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI7
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-857
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5856 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 A OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76AI 6ARI7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-858
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
5857 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-859
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5858
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 B OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-860
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5859 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/ia
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-861
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5860 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 1 C OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76AI6ARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-862
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5861 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-I
5) RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IA
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22 K1
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS IN ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-863
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5862 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
FPCA-I
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22KI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-864
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5863
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IB
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
FPCA-I
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IB
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76A22 K2
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS IN ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-865
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5864
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
FPCA-I
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22K2
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-866
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5865 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
FPCA-I
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IC
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22K3
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS IN ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-867
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5866
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
FPCA-I
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER IC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22K3
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BF13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-868
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5867 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-_
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22FI
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-869
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5868 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 B
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22F2
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-870
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5869 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 C
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22F3
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-871
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5870 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22AIR66
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-872
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5871 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR,
FAILS OPEN
5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF1)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 08-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIR67
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-873
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5872 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AIR68
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-874
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5873 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURINGARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-875
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5874 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FPCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AICRI
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-876
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5875 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AICR2
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-877
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5876 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FPCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22AICR2
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-878
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5877 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FPCA- 1
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-879
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5878 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-1
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BFI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-880
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5879 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC8
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-881
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5880 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC8
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND, AN IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-882
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5881
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 B
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 B
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3' ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC9
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-883
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5882 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA- 1
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC9
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-884
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5883 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 C
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPCI0
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-885
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5884 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
FPCA-I
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 1 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22RPC10
MC450-0017-1075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND, AN IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-886
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5885 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 A
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-1
5) INVERTER 1 A
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV 76AI
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-887
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5886 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 A
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 A
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A1
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BF10H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-888
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5887
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 A
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-889
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5888 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 A
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 A
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON: 8 iV76AI
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF10H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-890
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5889 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 B
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3 ) FLCA- 1
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 B
6)
"i)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76A2
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-891
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5890
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 B
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-1
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 B
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A2
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BF10E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-892
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
5891
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 B
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-1
5) INVERTER 1 B
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 iV 76A2
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-893
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5892 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 B
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-1
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 S
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A2
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF10E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-894
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5893
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 C
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : •3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76A3
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI0C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-895
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5894 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 C
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-1
4 ) FPCA- 1
5) INVERTER 1 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A3
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI0C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-896
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5895
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 C
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS IBC
2) RiA1 PANEL
3 ) FLCA- 1
4) FPCA-I
5) INVERTER 1 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A3
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI0C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-897
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5896 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 1 C
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 1BC
2) RiA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-I
4) FPCA-1
5) INVERTER 1 C
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTO FF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A3
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF10C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-898
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5897
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS i)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS i)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
•3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI9
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS RELAY IS TRIPPED OFF BY THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE
SENSOR AND THIS FAILURE OCCURS, THE RESULT IS THE LOSS OF ONE
PHASE OF THE AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-899
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5898 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS l)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 1BC
RIA1 PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS l)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS19
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD DISCONNECT ONE PHASE OF THE AC BUS FROM THE
INVERTER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-900
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
5899 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6AR9
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BG23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-901
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5900 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
FLCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A16AR9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BG23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-902
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6ARI0
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BG23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-903
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5902 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
FLCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 1 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A16AR10
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BG23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-904
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5903 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 CMD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
l) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
3) FLCA-I
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 CMD
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A16F
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-1030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-905
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5904 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 CMD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 CMD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6F
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-906
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5905 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 1
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35VSI
PART NUMBER: MC431-0129-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE
AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL AC BUSSES WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5906 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 1
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35VSI
PART NUMBER: MC431-0129-0011
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY DETECT
AND INTERRUPTAN OVERLOADED AC INVERTER. MANUAL METHODS OF
INVERTER SHUTDOWN ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT TO
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE
REFERENCES: 76BG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-908
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5907 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 A SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #1
FLCA-I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO I A SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR1
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-909
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5908 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-910
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5909 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) O5-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/5 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AlCR2
JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-911
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5910 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 B SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-912
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5911 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 C SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO i C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-913
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5912 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 C SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS I)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AICR3
JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-914
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5913 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 A RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS l)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-915
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5914 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AICR4
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG2 IH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-916
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5915 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AICR5
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-917
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5916 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-918
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5917 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS I)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 8 iV76A35AICR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-919
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5918 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GROUND C/O (AC BUS i)
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
3) FLCA-1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BG21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-920
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5919 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #1
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BGI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-921
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5920 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #i
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BG15F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-922
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5921 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #I
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AICR8
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BGI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-923
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5922 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 B RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #i
4) DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 B RESET)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AlCR8
JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: "76BGI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-924
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5923 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #1
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AICR9
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG15F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-925
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5924 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #I
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 1 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AICR9
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BGI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-926
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5925
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIR2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BG19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-927
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5926 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF1)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BG19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-928
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5927 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) 013 PANEL
3) RIAI PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W TO MDM OF1
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIR6
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BG19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5928 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 1BC
013 PANEL
RIA1 PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W TO MDM OF1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIR9
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BG19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-930
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5929 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #i
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #i
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIR7
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BG20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-931
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5930 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
e)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #1
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #I
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIR8
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BG20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-932
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5931
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 1 BUS SNSR)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 1BC
013 PANEL
RIA1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 1 BUS SNSR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS22
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-933
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5932 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 1 BUS SNSR)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 1BC
2) 013 PANEL
3 ) RIA1 PANEL
4) SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 1 BUS SNSR)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS22
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-934
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5933 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO ACI BUS SENSOR
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS IBC
013 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO ACI BUS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 33 V73A13 CB3
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-935
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5934 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO ACI BUS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 1BC
2) 013 PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER,
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
3A TO ACI BUS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CB3
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BF24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-936
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5935
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 1A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 8 lV76A35K1
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUSS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BGll
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-937
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
5936
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IA
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35KI
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BGII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-938
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5937 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 1B
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 1B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35K2
MC451-0122-0001(?)
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BGll
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-939
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5938 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 1B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IB
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITI CALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35K2
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BGll
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-940
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5939 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS iC
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
3) RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IC
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35K3
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BGII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-941
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5940 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS IC
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) O5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS iC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35K3
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BGII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-942
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B 
EPD&C
5941
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
B)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT ASSY #1
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 1
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-943
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5942 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT ASSY #1
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 1
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 8 lV76A35F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-1003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-944
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5943 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 C
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
e)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT ASSY #1
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 1
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35F3
ME451-0009-1003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BG9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-945
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5944 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT ASSY #i
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35F4
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-946
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5945 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 1
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
INV DIST CONT ASSY #I
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35F5
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-947
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5946 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST CONT ASSY #i
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35F6
PART NUMBER: MC451-0009-I003
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-948
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5947
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
ESS BUS IBC
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BG12H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-949
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5948 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) O5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
ESS BUS 1BC
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BGI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-950
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B 
EPD&C
5949
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
ESS BUS IBC
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OFt)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIR5
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BGI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-951
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5950 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 4.3K 1/SW (AC BUS 1 A VOLTAGE)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
RESISTOR, 4.3K i/8W (AC BUS 1 A VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI6
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BG9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-952
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5951 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 1 B VOLTAGE)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 1 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIRI7
RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BG9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-953
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5952 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 1 C VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 1 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIRI8
RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BG9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-954
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5953 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 1 A VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 1 A VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI3
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-955
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5954 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 1 B VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 1 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI4
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGIOD
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-956
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5955 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 1 C VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 1 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI5
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGIOB
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-957
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5956 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 A CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 A CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35AIR10
RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-958
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5957 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 B CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 B CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRII
PART NUMBER: RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-959
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5958 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 C CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE PWR MONITOR
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 1 C CURRENT)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 81V76A35AIRI2
PART NUMBER: RLR05C1003GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BGI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-960
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5959 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AC VOLTMETER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN OR SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) F9A2 PANEL
2) AC VOLTMETER
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A9A2MI
MC432-0237-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS METER PROVIDES NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENT VISABILITY IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-961
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5960 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #i
L4 PANEL
F1 PANEL
M052J PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73A124S2
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BHI5B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-962
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5961 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 1
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #I
L4 PANEL
F1 PANEL
M052J PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PKRTNUMBER:
80V73AI24S2
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BHI5B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-963
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5962 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #i
L4 PANEL
F1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73AIS2
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BHI5D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-964
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5963 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #i
L4 PANEL
F1 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 1 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73AIS2
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BHI5D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-965
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5964 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
L4 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO AC UTIL POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 31V73A4CB28
PART NUMBER: MC452-0032-3030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO AN AC UTILITY
OUTLET. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BHI5G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-966
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/Ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5965 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD,: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
s) os-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
L4 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO AC UTIL POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 31V73A4CB28
PART NUMBER: MC452-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO AN AC UTILITY
OUTLET. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BHISG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-967
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5966
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-1
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CBI
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-968
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5967 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-1
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73A129CB1
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-969
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5968 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB2
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-970
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5969 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-971
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5970 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB3
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-972
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
5971
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB3
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-973
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5972 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-I
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
2/1R AOA: 2/1R
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB4
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-974
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5973 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-I
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-I
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PARTNUMBER:
85V73AI29CB4
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-975
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5974 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IA TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 1A TO RCS/OMS-1
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB38
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-976
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5975 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IA TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IA TO RCS/OMS-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB38
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-977
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5976 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IB TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IB TO RCS/OMS-I
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB39
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-978
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5977 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IB TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IB TO RCS/OMS-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB39
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-979
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5978 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IC TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC IC TO RCS/OMS-I
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB40
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-980
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5979
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC iC TO RCS/OMS-I
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
3) MA73C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 1C TO RCS/OMS-I
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB40
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BJ23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-981
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5980
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD AC1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY TO PLBD AC1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76Al19K20
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJ14E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-982
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5981 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K20
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAI_YRE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE I_ST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BJI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-983
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5982 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K22
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-984
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5983 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/i_
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K22
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTD'P_KL FAIL_, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BJI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-985
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5984 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII7K66
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJ7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-986
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5985 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY TO PLBD ACl
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII7K66
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BJ7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-987
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5986 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY TO PLBD ACl
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A117K78
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJ7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-988
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5987 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD ACI
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY TO PLBD ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A!I7K78
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BJ7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-989
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5988 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A117K80
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJ6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-990
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5989 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) AC BUS 1
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII7K80
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAI_P_E, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BJ6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-991
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5990 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-_
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII7K84
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BJ6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-992
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5991 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
e)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-I
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AI17K84
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BJ6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-993
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5992 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 1
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
3) MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACl
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K7
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BK23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-994
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5993 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K7
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULDREMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BK23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-995
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5994 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACl
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/1R AOA: 3/3
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A119K9
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BK23E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-996
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5995 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 1
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-ACI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K9
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTU1%AL FAIL_RE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE ANACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BK23E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-997
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87 HIGHES T CRIT I CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5996 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 A)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIA1 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB4
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-998
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5997 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 A)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB4
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-999
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
5998
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 B)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE I_UNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB5
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1000
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
5999 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER,
FAILS CLOSED
3A (AC CONT 2 B)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 B)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB5
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTA/_INATION, PIECE PART STRUCTUI_AL FAILLrRE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1001
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6000 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB6
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I002
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/B7
EPD&C
6001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 C)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 2 C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB6
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILLrRE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULDHAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1003
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6002 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #2)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI7
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON NORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS
THE AC INVERTERS ARE LATCHED ON DURING PRELAUNCH. ALTERNATE
MEANS EXIST TO TURN OFF ONE AC BUS PHASE IF REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 76BM24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I004
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6003 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER P_ #2)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #2)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS 17
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILLrRE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS TO THE "OFF" SIDE OF THE SWITCH, AT LEAST
ONE INVERTER WILL BE SHUT DOWN AND COULD NOT BE: RESTARTED. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BM24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1005
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE PWR
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7AR4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I006
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6005 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR4
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1007
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI 7AR5
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I008
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6007 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN B TO INV 2 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7AR5
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1009
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 A ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: "3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AITARII
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BMITG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I010
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 A ON)
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARII
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT _RING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS ANINVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1011
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 B ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARI2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I012
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 B ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76AI 7ARI 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I013
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 C ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) 08-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARI3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i014
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 C ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 2 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AITARI3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BMITA
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1015
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI4
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUNDI
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1016
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A ON)
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2 ) FLCA-2
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A ON)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI4
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I017
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A17AR15
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BM16D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1018
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B ON)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI5
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWERTO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I019
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI6
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1020
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
6019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C ON)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI6
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I021
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6020 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A OFF)
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI7
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I022
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6021 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 A OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI7
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TOTURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS 2_E STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I023
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6022 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B OFF)
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1024
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6023 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 B OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS _E STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i025
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 6024 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) FLCA-2
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C OFF)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BM16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i026
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6025 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 2 C OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AITARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BM16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i027
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 CMD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 CMD
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7F
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i028
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6027 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 CMD
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 CMD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7F
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I029
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2C OFF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2 ) FLCA- 2
3) FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2C OFF
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7F5
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BM16
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i030
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2B OFF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2B OFF
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7F6
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTA/4INATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1031
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2A OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1032
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2C ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
S) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7F8
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I033
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23FI
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I034
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F2
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I035
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 C
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
FUSE, 80A TO INV 2 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23F3
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BM13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i036
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6035 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR,
FAILS OPEN
5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I037
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AIR4
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I038
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AIR5
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACKS) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1039
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AICRI
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i040
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1041
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AICR4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i042
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6041 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAITNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: 82 V76A23AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i043
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23AICR3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I044
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEE_2
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURINGARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BMI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I045
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6044 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE TO INV 2 A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE TO INV 2 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] cC ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A23 CR22
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED ORLOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I046
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FI.IGHT:
MDAC ID: 6045 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 2 A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE TO INV 2 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23CR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS t VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i047
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6046 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 2 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE TO INV 2 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23CR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I048
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6047 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE TO INV 2 B
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE TO INV 2 B
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23CR23
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I049
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 2 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
DIODE TO INV 2 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23CR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1050
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6049 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 2 C
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
4) DIODE TO INV 2 C
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23CR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THER/4AL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1051
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC7
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM12F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1052
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC7
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AN IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN INVERTER
RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I053
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 B
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC8
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1054
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6053 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
FPCA-2
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A23 RPC8
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMI_ATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AN IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN INVERTER
RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I055
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 C
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23RPC9
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I056
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6055 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) FPCA-2
4) RPC, 7.5A TO INV 2 C
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82 V76A23 RPC9
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AN IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN INVERTER
RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BMI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I057
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6056
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23KI
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I058
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23KI
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILtTRE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1059
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6058 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2B
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23K2
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I060
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2B
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23K2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BMI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1061
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6060 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2C
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A23K3
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BM13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i062
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31111s_
EPD&C
6061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2C
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
FPCA-2
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 2C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A23K3
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BM13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I063
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6062 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 A
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A4
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I064
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6063 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 A
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 A
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V 76A4
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1065
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: INVERTER 2 A
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 A
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A4
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I066
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6065 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 A
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 A
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A4
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1067
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 B
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 B
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A5
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1068
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 B
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 B
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A5
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1069
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6068
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: INVERTER 2 B
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3 ) FLCA- 2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 B
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A5
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1070
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6069 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 B
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 B
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A5
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTUIKAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1071
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6070 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 C
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A6
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMI0C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I072
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C F]"IGHT:
MDAC ID: 6071 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 C
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 C
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A6
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1073
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6072 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 C
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIA1 PANEL
3 ) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A6
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i074
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6073 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 2 C
PHASE REF CHANGE
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD:: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-2
4) FPCA-2
5) INVERTER 2 C
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A6
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTErRAL FAILtrRE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BMIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1075
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6074 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI 7AR9
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BN23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i076
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI 7AR9
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BN23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I077
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6076 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI0
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BN23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I078
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6077 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-_
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 2 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARI0
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BN23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1079
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6078 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2B ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2 ) FLCA- 2
3) FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2B ON
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I080
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C F] .IGHT:
MDAC ID: 6079 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2A ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7FI0
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BMI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1081
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6080 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 2)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORB I T: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS20
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS RELAY IS TRIPPED OFF BY THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE
SENSOR AND THIS FAILURE OCCURS, THE RESULT IS THE LOSS OF ONE
PHASE OF THE AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I082
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6081 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 2)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS20
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILirRE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD DISCONNECT ONE PHASE OF THE AC BUS FROM THE
INVERTER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1083
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6082 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC2 BUS SENSOR
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 2CA
2) 013 PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC2 BUS SENSOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBII
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I084
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC2 BUS SENSOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
013 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC2 BUS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBII
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1085
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6084 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 2 BUS SNSR)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 2 BUS SNSR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS23
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i086
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6085 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 2 BUS SNSR)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 2 BUS SNSR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS23
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I087
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6086 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
i) GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A SET)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICRI
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES : 76 BN2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I088
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6087 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3 ) FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A SET)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1089
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6088 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82 V 76A36AICR2
JANTXV IN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I090
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6089 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82 V76A36AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1091
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6090 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICR3
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76 BN2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I092
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6091 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A36AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I093
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6092 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i094
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6093 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I095
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6094 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 B RESET)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICR5
JANTXVlN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i096
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6095
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os- 
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBP.ATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I097
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6096 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICR6
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I098
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6097 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 2)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BN21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I099
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6098 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II00
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6099 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6100 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET
RELAY. THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1102
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6101 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AICR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICR9
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-ll04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 2 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AICR9
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET
RELAY. THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BNI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1105
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36FI
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-ii06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 2
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1107
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
3) AC O/V VOLT SNSR 2
4) FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 C
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36F3
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BN9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6107 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) AC BUS 2
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36F4
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1109
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36F5
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-Ill0
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
3) FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36F6
PART NUMBER: MC451-0009-I003
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-Ill1
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
6110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 08-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36KI
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001 (?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUSS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BNII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2A
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
3) RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2A
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36KI
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BNII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II13 ,
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36K2
MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BNII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2B
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 2
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A36K2
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001 (?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BNII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1115
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2C
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 82V76A36K3
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BNll
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-ill6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6115 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2C
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT ASSY #2
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 2C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36K3
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAII_RE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BNII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIRI
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BN19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AIR2
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BN19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-II19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
ESS BUS 2CA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BNI2H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6119 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
ESS BUS 2CA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTA24INATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BNI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
ESS BUS 2CA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A36AIR5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BNI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B' 
EPD&C
6121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIR6
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
] S [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BN19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIR7
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BN20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6123 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #2
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A36AIR8
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BN20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C'1125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/4W (TO MDM OF2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W (TO MDM OF2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AIR9
RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BN19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 A CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 A CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIRI0
PART NUMBER: RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BNI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 B CURRENT)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GSE PWR MONITOR
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 B CURRENT)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AIRII
RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BN13D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 C CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 2 C CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AIR12
RLR05Cl003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BN13B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 2 A VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 2 A VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIRI3
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BNIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 2 B VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 2 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIRI4
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BNIOD
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I131
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6130 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 2 C VOLTAGE)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 2 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36AIRI5
RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BNIOB
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6131 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 2 A VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE PWR MONITOR
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 2 A VOLTAGE)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A36AIR16
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BN9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6132 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K 1/SW (AC BUS 2 B VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 4.3K 1/SW (AC BUS 2 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIR17
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BN9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6133 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K i/8W (AC BUS 2 C VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RESISTOR, 4.3K i/8W (AC BUS 2 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76A36AIRI8
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BN9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 2
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDERVOLT SNSR 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS :
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36VSI
MC431-0129-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE
AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL AC BUSSES WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36VSI
MC431-0129-0011
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE
AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL AC BUSSES WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C=I137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI5
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO A PAYLOAD
PATCH PANEL. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BP9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129 CBI5
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO A PAYLOAD
PATCH PANEL. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BP9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2A TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2A TO RCS/OMS-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB41
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[ ] C[ ]
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2A TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2A TO RCS/OMS-2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB41
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BR23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2B TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2B TO RCS/OMS-2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB42
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2B TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2B TO RCS/OMS-2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB42
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BR23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2C TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2C TO RCS/OMS-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB43
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i144
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2C TO RCS/OMS-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 2C TO RCS/OMS-2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB43
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BR24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [PP ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB5
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BR22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I146
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB5
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA7 3 C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-1
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB6
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB6
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BR22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6148 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB7
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BR22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA73 C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB7
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCKr THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB8
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB8
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BR22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6152 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB9
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRE TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD
BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BR22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6153 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6154 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI0
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BR22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA73 C PANEL
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/1R
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI0
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BR22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K65
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6157 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA7 3C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K65
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K77
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULDREMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I160
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6159 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII9K77
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K37
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K37
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHSHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BRI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K39
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BR17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i164
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K39
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K56
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K56
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BR16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6166 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K58
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BRI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K58
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BRI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K29
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i170
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K29
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BR9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6170 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AI20K41
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BR9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1 I/87 HI GHE S T CRI TI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) AC BUS 2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K41
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6172 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K49
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6173 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: • 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K49
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BR8D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6174 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K61
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BR8C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K61
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BR8C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB7
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I178
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 A)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB7
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL RAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6178 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 B)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB8
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 B)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 B)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB8
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6180 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 C)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAICB9
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE INVERTER
(ONE AC PHASE OF ONE AC BUS). SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND HAVE LATCHED POWER INPUTS, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ONCE THE INVERTERS WERE STARTED.
HOWEVER, IF THIS FAILURE OCCURED AFTER A PHASE HAD TRIPPED OUT,
THE PHASE COULD NOT BE RE-ENERGIZED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
RE-POWER THE AC BUSSES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 C)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC CONT 3 C)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAICB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CB IS CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND THE CREW MAY
SWITCH OUT THIS CIRCUIT WITH A TOGGLE SWITCH IN CASE OF AN
OVERLOAD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE AC
BUS. SINCE MOST AC MOTORS CAN OPERATE ON TWO PHASES, THIS
FAILURE PLUS AN OVERLOAD CONDITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #3)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #3)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAISI8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7305
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS TO THE "OFF" SIDE OF THE SWITCH, AT LEAST
ONE INVERTER WILL BE SHUT DOWN AND COULD NOT BE RESTARTED. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BU24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I184
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #3)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INVERTER PWR #3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAISI8
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS
AS THE AC INVERTERS ARE LATCHED ON DURING PRE-LAUNCH. ALTERNATE
MEANS OF REMOVING A PHASE FROM THE AC BUS EXIST.
REFERENCES: 76BU24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76AI 8AR4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I186
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6185 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 03-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8AR4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI8F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6186 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR5
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (MN C TO INV 3 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V 76AI 8AR5
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6188 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 A ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS 3AB
2) FLCA-3
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 A ON)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARII
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111/87
EPD&C
6189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 A ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 A ON)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARII
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 c-n91 C 3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6190 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 B ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI2
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 B ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI2
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6192 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 C ON)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA- 3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI3
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF INVERTER CONTROL INPUT SUCH THAT
THE INVERTER COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. NORMAL FLIGHT PROCEDURE IS
TO LEAVE INVERTER RUNNING AND DISCONNECT ITS OUTPUT IF REQUIRED.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-I194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 C ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II (INV 3 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI 8ARI3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL INPUT POWER TO THE
INVERTER (7.5A STILL AVAILABLE), CAUSING A LOW POWER PHASE ON ONE
AC BUS. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND
LATCHED ON, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING NORMAL
FLIGHT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE UNLESS AN INVERTER IS
POWERED DOWN AND A RESTART IS ATTEMPTED. THIS IS AN OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6194 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AISARI4
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-i196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI4
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6196 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI5
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6197 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B ON)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI5
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1199
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6198 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) FLCA-3
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C ON)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI6
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF FULL POWER TO AN AC INVERTER
(7.5A STILL AVAILABLE). WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER
BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE RESTARTED WITH FULL POWER. INVERTERS ARE
STARTED ON THE GROUND AND NORMALLY KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI6
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PA/_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT POWER CONTROL TO THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT SINCE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND
AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6200 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI7
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1202
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6201 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 A OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8ARI7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6202 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 B OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI8
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PA/_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WdULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6204 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C OFF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ENERGIZE THE "OFF" RELAY TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS
OF ALL AC POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BU16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6205 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C OFF)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (INV 3 C OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO TURN THE INVERTER
OFF. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE SINCE THE INVERTER OUTPUT
CAN BE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS LOADS. INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND KEPT ON DURING A FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BU16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6206 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8F5
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BU16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1208
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3B OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEA[): K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A18 F6
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULDHAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3A OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA- 3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3A OFF
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8F7
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW MISSION VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1210
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6209 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3C ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8F8
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1211
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3B ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA- 3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3B ON
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8F9
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3A ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8FI0
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BUI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3 / IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24FI
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24F2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-0080
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24F3
ME451-0016-0080
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE INVERTER AC PHASE
OUTPUT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BU13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83 V76A24AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6216 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A24AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6218 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24AICR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6219 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AICR3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/II/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FPCA-3
4) DIODE, ISOLATION
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS IN A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
MEANS OF MEASURING ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
ALTERNATE
REFERENCES: 76BUI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) o5-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATI ON: 83 V 76A24 CRI 3
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24 CRI 3
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1224
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24CRI4
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 B
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON: 83 V 76A24 CRI 4
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1226
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A24CRI5
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED ORLOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 3 C
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FPCA-3
DIODE TO INV 3 C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24CRI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1228
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACK) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24AIR4
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACK) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI4E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A24AIR5
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] BC ] cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM SUPPORTS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT FUNCTION.
ALTERNATE INDICATORS (TALKBACK) PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI4B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6230
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPC8
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6231
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 A
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FPCA-3
4) RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 A
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPC8
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 B
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FPCA-3
4) RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 B
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24RPC9
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31111sv
EPD&C
6233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) OS-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24RPC9
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6234 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/-3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 C
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) FPCA-3
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPCI0
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE AC INVERTER FROM BEING TURNED OFF.
HOWEVER THE INPUT CURRENT WOULD BE LIMITED TO 7.5 AMPS.
INVERTERS ARE NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, SO NO EFFECT
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6235 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 7.5A TO INV 3 C
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
FPCA-3
RPC, 7o5A TO INV 3 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24RPCI0
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STI_ESS t VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION ON
THE INVERTER STARTUP. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE
GROUND AND IN-FLIGHT FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF AN
INVERTER RESTART IS NEEDED IN-FLIGHT, IT MAY BE DAMAGED OR LOST.
REFERENCES: 76BUI2A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6236
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24KI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6237 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24KI
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BUI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6238 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3B
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RiA1 PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A24 K2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BU13E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6239
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24K2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1241
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3C
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN 9
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24K3
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DC POWER TO THE INVERTER
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS.
REDUNDANT POWER IS AVAILABLE FOR CRITICAL LOADS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BU13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1242
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3C
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
RELAY, LATCHING TO INVERTER 3C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A24K3
MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHQCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT REMOVING DC POWER TO THE INPUT OF THE
INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS IS NORMAL
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BU13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6242 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 A
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83 V 76A7
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1244
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 A
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 A
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A7
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
ITEM: INVERTER 3 A
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3 ) FLCA- 3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON: 83 V 76A7
PART NUMBER: MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 A
PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 A
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A7
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3 / 1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 B
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 B
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A8
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6247
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 B
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIA1 PANEL
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9) os-6
FLCA-3
FPCA-3
INVERTER 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A8
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1249
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6248 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 B
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 B
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A8
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1250
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6249 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 B
PHASE REF CHANGE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 B
6)
v)
s)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A8
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6250 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 C
FAILS OFF, OUTPUT UNDER/OVER VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 C
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A9
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE
PHASE AC BUSS. MOST MOTORS ON THE VEHICLE CAN OPERATE ON TWO
PHASES. CRITICAL LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED FROM THE OTHER TWO
BUSSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1252
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 C
OVERLOAD SIGNAL FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 C
6)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A9
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE PREVENTS THE AUTOMATIC CUT OFF OF THE OVERLOADED
INVERTER. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO DETECT OVERLOAD CONDITION VIA
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSORS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6252 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTER 3 C
INADVERTENT OVERLOAD SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3 ) FLCA- 3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 C
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A9
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS TO
BE LOST. THE PHASE COULD BE RESTORED BY CREW ACTION AND THE
SIGNAL INHIBITED. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THIS MODE MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUIOC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1254
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6253 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: INVERTER 3 C
FAILURE MODE: PHASE REF CHANGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
4) FPCA-3
5) INVERTER 3 C
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A9
MC495-0012-0004
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE AN OVERLOAD SIGNAL TO BE OUTPUT
AND ALL THREE PHASES OF ONE AC BUS WOULD BE CUT OFF. CRITICAL
LOADS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED SO NO EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BUI0C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 ON)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BV22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6255 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 ON)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 ON)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8AR9
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BV22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6256 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 OFF)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8ARI0
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BV22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6257 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 OFF)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III (AC BUS 3 OFF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8ARI0
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY.
REFERENCES: 76BV22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 3)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 3)
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUN C
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/iS TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIS21
ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS RELAY IS TRIPPED OFF BY THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE
SENSOR AND THIS FAILURE OCCURS, THE RESULT IS THE LOSS OF ONE
PHASE OF THE AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6259 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 3)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (INV/AC BUS 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS21
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7305
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTA/4INATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD DISCONNECT ONE PHASE OF THE AC BUS FROM THE
INVERTER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV24F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6260
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 3 BUS SNSR)
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 3 BUS SNSR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 24
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7103
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTIONAND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B7
EPD&C
6261
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 3 BUS SNSR)
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (AC 3 BUS SNSR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIS 24
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AC OVER/UNDER
VOLTAGE SENSOR WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DETECTION AND CORRECTION
OF AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6262 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC3 BUS SENSOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC3 BUS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 33V73A13 CBI7
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1264
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC3 BUS SENSOR
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A TO AC3 BUS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CBI7
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERPLKL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN THE SENSOR MONITOR/AUTO SWITCH
FAILS ALSO. THE RESULT IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND
CORRECT AN INVERTER/AC BUS ERROR CONDITION. LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF POWER TO
CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV24B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6264 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 3
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS #3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 3
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO :
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: 83V76A37VS 1
PART NUMBER: MC431-0129-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE
AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL AC BUSSES WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
s) o5-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37VS 1
PART NUMBER: MC431-0129-0011
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE PHASE
AC BUS. LOSS OF ALL AC BUSSES WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6266
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (3 TO A SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICRI
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1268
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AICRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR2
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B SET)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR2
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6270 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C SET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR3
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C SET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C SET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AICR3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA- 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1274
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AICR4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6274 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR5
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6275 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AICR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6276
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
F LCA - 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR6
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED FOR GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND IS NON-CRITICAL
FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6277 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GROUND C/O (AC BUS 3)
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR6
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SENSOR TURNS ONE PHASE OFF, THIS
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE AC BUS. DURING HIGH
WORKLOAD PERIODS THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6278 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR7
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY.
SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE INCLUDING REMOVING DC
POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BVI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6279 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 C RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A37AICR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BVI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1281
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6280
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
4) DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR8
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY. SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE
INCLUDING REMOVING DC POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BVI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1282
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6281
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 B RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A37AICR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4944
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES: 76BVISF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6282
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AICR9
JANTXVIN4944
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RESET THE
AFFECTED PHASE RELAY WHEN THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR TRIPS.
HOWEVER, THE CREW WILL HEAR ALARMS AND BE ABLE TO RESET THE PHASE
RELAY AUTOMATICALLY. SEVERAL MEANS OF MANUAL RESET ARE AVAILABLE
INCLUDING REMOVING DC POWER FROM THE AFFECTED INVERTER. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BVI5F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6283 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
DIODE, BLOCKING IA (TO 3 A RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AICR9
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4944
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION BETWEEN
THE AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SENSOR AND THE AFFECTED PHASE RESET RELAY.
THE SENSOR HAS AN INTERNAL ISOLATION DIODE AS A BACK-UP.
REFERENCES : 76BV 15F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6284 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AIR1
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BV19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1286
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6285
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
AC BUS OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE SNSR
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AIR2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BV19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIR3
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BVI2H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 c-1288 <.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BVI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1289
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6288 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR,
FAILS OPEN
5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
ESS BUS 3AB
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIR5
RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEASUREMENT IS NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BVI2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6289 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W TO MDM OF3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AIR6
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BV19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6290
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIR7
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BV20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6291 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO MDM OF3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT & ASSY #3
AC OVER/UNDER VOLT SNSR #3
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIR8
RLR07CI82GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR IS PART OF A MONITORING FUNCTION AND IS
NOT CRITICAL FOR VEHICLE OPERATION.
REFERENCES: 76BV20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1293
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6292 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
013 PANEL
RIAI PANEL
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/4W TO MDM OF3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37AIR9
PART NUMBER: RLR20C222GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76BV19C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6293 ABORT:
HDw/FuNc
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 A CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 A CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AIRI0
PART NUMBER: RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVI3E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6294
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 B CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 B CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37A3RII
RLR05CI003GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1296
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6295 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 C CURRENT)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 100K (AC BUS 3 C CURRENT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A37A3RI2
PART NUMBER: RLR05CI003GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT USED DURING
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVI3B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6296 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 3 A VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEADANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE PWR MONITOR
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 3 A VOLTAGE)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AIRI3
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVIOE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6297 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 3 B VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 3 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AIRI4
PART NUMBER: RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVIOD
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6298 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 150K I/2W (AC BUS 3 C VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 150K i/2W (AC BUS 3 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIRI5
RLR20CI54GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BVIOB
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 3 A VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 3 A VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37AIRI6
RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BV9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 3 B VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 3 B VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37AIR17
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BV9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6301 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 4.3K 1/8W (AC BUS 3 C VOLTAGE)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE PWR MONITOR
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RESISTOR, 4.3K I/8W (AC BUS 3 C VOLTAGE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76A37AIR18
PART NUMBER: RLR05C432GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A GSE MEASUREMENT THAT IS NOT CRITICAL DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: 76BV9A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1303
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118v
EPD&C
6302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
3) AC O/V VOLT SNSR 3
4) FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 A
5)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6
•CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37FI
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1304
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6303 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 B
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37F2
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6304 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-_
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
AC O/V VOLT SNSR 3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37F3
ME451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE AC BUS SENSOR SWITCH IS IN "AUTO", THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC BUS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BV9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1306
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37 F4
PART NUMBER: MC451-0009-I003
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV9E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37F5
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1308
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6307 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
FUSE, 3A TO AC VOLTMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37F6
MC451-0009-I003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE CONNECTS TO A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
ALTERNATE MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV9B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1309
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37KI
MC451-0122-0001 (?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B?
EPD&C
6309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37KI
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3B
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37K2
MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1312
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3B
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37K2
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATI ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3C
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITI CALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37K3
MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE
AC BUS. REDUNDANT BUSSES WOULD PROVIDE POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICAL LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1314
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6313 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3C
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST CONT ASSY #3
RELAY, LATCHING TO AC BUS 3C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37K3
PART NUMBER: MC451-0122-0001(?)
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE INABILITY TO DISCONNECT THE PHASE
FROM THE AC BUS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS THIS RELAY
IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BVII
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1315
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/Ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO AC UTIL POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 3IV73A4 CB29
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO AN AC UTILITY
OUTLET. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BWI5G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1316
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO AC UTIL POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
31V73A4CB29
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO AN AC UTILITY
OUTLET. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BWISG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) AC BUS #3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO PAYLOAD
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI6
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO A PAYLOAD
PATCH PANEL. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BW9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A 3-P
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3P 3A TO PAYLOAD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI6
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILEFRE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO A PAYLOAD
PATCH PANEL. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BW9C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6318 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-_
AC BUS #3
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
AI5 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AI5S3
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BWI5D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6319 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
AI5 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AI5S3
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BWI5D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6320 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
AI5 PANEL
M013Q PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73A81SI2
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BWISB
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AC BUS #3
INV & DIST CONT ASSY #3
L4 PANEL
AI5 PANEL
M013Q PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (AC BUS 3 UTIL PWR)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
80V73A8 IS 12
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH CONTROLS A NON-CRITICAL AC UTILITY POWER OUTLET.
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: 76BWI5B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1323
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3A TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73 C PANEL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3A TO RCS/OMS-3
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ii ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB44
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BY23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1324
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3A TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3A TO RCS/OMS-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB44
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6324 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3B TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3B TO RCS/OMS-3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB45
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHSHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BY23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3B TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3B TO RCS/OMS-3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB45
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6326 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3C TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3C TO RCS/OMS-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ii ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB46
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF THE THREE PHASE AC
RCS/OMS BUS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL ISOLATION VALVES AND
MANIFOLDS DURING A CROSSFEED SITUATION WHERE THE PROP TANKS ARE
ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: 76BY23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6327
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3C TO RCS/OMS-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER AC 3C TO RCS/OMS-3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB46
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY23B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6328 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-3
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBII
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD LOSE ALL POWER TO
THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BY22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-3
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBII
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1331
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73 C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORB IT: 2/ 1R AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI2
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL
POWER TO THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO
STRUCTURAL
DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED. AFTER SECOND
FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRED TO CLOSE AND LATCH PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BY22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1332
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CBI2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1333
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6332
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI3
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL
POWER TO THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
AFTER SECOND FAILURE, CREW EVA REQUIRED TO CLOSE AND LATCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AND LATCHES.
REFERENCES: 76BY22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1334
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6333 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB13
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY22D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1 i/87 HI GHEST CRI T I CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73 C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-3
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CBI4
MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHSHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT AC POWER
SOURCES TO DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL
POWER TO THESE MOTORS. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS LIKELY DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE ON ENTRY, IF DOORS CANNOT BE OPERATED.
REFERENCES: 76BY22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6335 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB14
PART NUMBER: MC454-0032-3030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BY22H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6336 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K42
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BYI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1338
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K42
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BYI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1339
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K54
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BYI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6339
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73 C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K54
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BYI4F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1341
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6340
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AI20K8
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BY16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8 
EPD&C
6341
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
S)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K8
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BY16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1343
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 6342 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
4) MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K20
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT AC POWER TO THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MOTORS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCE WOULD PREVENT CLOSING THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS PRIOR TO
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BY16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1344
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K20
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT PREMATURE
POWER TO THE P/L BAY DOORS. IF POWER WERE APPLIED PREMATURELY
(MULTIPLE FAILURES), THE CREW/VEHICLE COULD BE LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE OPENING OR CLOSING THE P/L BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: 76BY16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 3
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A120K30
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BY15C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1346
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6345
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS 3
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/ 1R ATO: 3/ 1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AI20K30
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BY15C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1347
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AI20K42
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BYI5C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1348
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-4
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K42
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE ANACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BY15C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 6348 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) AC BUS 3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K61
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BZ2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1350
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K61
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE AN ACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BZ2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1351
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6350 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS 3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K63
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE POWER SOURCE TO DUAL
REDUNDANT POWERED FUNCTIONS. SECOND FAILURE COULD MAKE THESE
FUNCTIONS (PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCHES) INOPERATIVE. THIS IS VERY
LIKELY TO CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: 76BZ2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1352
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6351 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) AC BUS 3
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
MMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76AII8K63
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD REMOVE REDUNDANT PROTECTION FROM
INADVERTENTLY POWERING A PAYLOAD BUS. SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT WOULD SUPPLY POWER TO CERTAIN PAYLOAD LOADS. THIRD
FAILURE IN THE LOAD MAY PREMATURELY CAUSE ANACTION THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BZ2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1353
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6352
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #i)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) 017 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #I)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI7A8RI
RWR80S 12 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE MEC.
THE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO BOTH MECS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW DUE TO INABILITY TO SEPERATE THE ET AND SRBS.
REFERENCES: 76DA24G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1354
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #i)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS AB2
017 PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 33V73AI7A8R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE MEC.
THE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO BOTH MECS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW DUE TO INABILITY TO SEPERATE THE ET AND SRBS.
REFERENCES: 76DA24C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1355
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118v
EPD&C
6354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS BCI
2) 017 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #2)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI7A9R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE MEC.
THE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO BOTH MECS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW DUE TO INABILITY TO SEPERATE THE ET AND SRBS.
REFERENCES: 76DAI3G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6355
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #2)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS BC2
017 PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC #2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI7A9RI
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE MEC.
THE LOSS OF ALL POWER TO BOTH MECS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW DUE TO INABILITY TO SEPERATE THE ET AND SRBS.
REFERENCES: 76DA13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1357
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6356
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES ABI & AB2
017 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73A17S5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1358
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6357 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC i)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES ABI & AB2
017 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC I)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI7S5
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO ONE
MECo LOSS OF ALL POWER TO MECS DURING LIFTOFF OR ABORT PHASES
WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
COMPLETE MEC FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA24
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1359
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6358 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC 2)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONTROL BUSSES BCI & BC2
017 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI7S6
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA12
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1360
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6359
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC 2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES BCl & BC2
017 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (MEC 2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 33V73AITS6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO ONE
MEC. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO MECS DURING LIFTOFF OR ABORT PHASES
WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
COMPLETE MEC FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA12
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6360 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OAI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS ABI
017 PANEL
APCA-I
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W TO MDM OAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI31AIR4
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76DA21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1362
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6361 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OA2
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS BCI
017 PANEL
APCA-2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OA2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132AIR12
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI2GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: 76DA9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6362
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) APCA-5
APCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: 55V76A132RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
ONE MEC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6363 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
APCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132RPC3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-Ii00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF RPC CONTROL TO ONE OF TWO
POWER SOURCES TO ONE MEC. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS
THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
APCA-3
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC5
MC450-0017-1100 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
ONE MEC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31111sv
EPD&C
6365
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #2
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
APCA-6
APCA-3
RPC, IOA TO MEC #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A133RPC5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF RPC CONTROL TO ONE OF TWO
POWER SOURCES TO ONE MEC. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS
THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA9D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1367
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3 ) AP CA - 5
4) APCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MEC #i
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132RPC2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
ONE MEC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1368
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6367
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #i
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) APCA-5
APCA-2
RPC, 10A TO MEC #I
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A132RPC2
MC450-0017-1100 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF RPC CONTROL TO ONE OF TWO
POWER SOURCES TO ONE MEC. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS
THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1369
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6368
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
_3/1R
311R
ITEM: RPC, 10A TO MEC #i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3 ) APCA- 4
APCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MEC #I
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 54V76A13 IRPC5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER SOURCES TO
ONE MEC. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO POWER CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: 76DA20H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1370
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6369 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A TO MEC #1
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
APCA-4
APCA-I
RPC, 10A TO MEC #I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI3 IRPC5
MC450-0017-II00 (?-2100)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF RPC CONTROL TO ONE OF TWO
POWER SOURCES TO ONE MEC. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION AS
THIS IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76DA20H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1371
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6370
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 32V73A2CR7
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76MI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1372
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6371 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR7
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY I0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: 76MI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1373
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHFST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6372 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBS_[S LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
R15 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2CR8
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, 'VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY l0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: 76M12E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1374
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6373 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
3) RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA2)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IRI ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR8
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76MI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1375
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118 
EPD&C
6374
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CAS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2CR9
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE CONTROL BUS HAS REDUNDANT
POWER SUPPLIED THROUGH TWO RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT POWER TO
THE NINE CONTROL BUSSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF CRITICAL FUNCTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES: 76MI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1376
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RI5 PANEL
R2 PANEL
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS CA3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A2CR9
JANTXlNI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REVERSE CURRENT PROTECTION BETWEEN ONE TRIAD OF CONTROL
BUSSES. CONTROL BUS CIRCUIT IS FURTHER PROTECTED BY i0 A CIRCUIT
BREAKER. THE NET RESULT IS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: 76MI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1377
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6376 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
013 PANEL
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN C CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: NOT SHOWN ON 76YI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1378
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6377 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) 013 PANEL
3) MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN C CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR5
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
REFERENCES: NOT SHOWN ON 76YI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6378 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN C CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI3CR6
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNTIL THIRD FAILURE AND A MAIN DC BUS
OR FUEL CELL MUST BE ISOLATED AND MAIN DC BUSSES TIED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD RESULT IN THIS CASE.
REFERENCES: SHOWN AS CRI6 ON 76YI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6379 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
013 PANEL
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN C CONTR
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3CR6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN ESS BUS AND MAIN
BUS. CIRCUIT BREAKERS COULD BE OPENED IF ISOLATION REQUIRED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SHOWN AS CRI6 ON 76YI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1381
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6380 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 A
FAILS OPEN
LEADANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
3) FPCA- 1
4) DIODE TO INV 1 A
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8IV76A22 CRI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER.
SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON",
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF
THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE
DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES
TO
HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1382
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6381 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE TO INV 1 A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22CRI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6382 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE TO INV 1 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ II C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 iV76A22 CRI 6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTERHAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1384
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6383
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 B
SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE TO INV 1 B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A22CRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
,7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE TO INV 1 C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A22 CRI7
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF INPUT CURRENT SURGE
PROTECTION TO THE INVERTER. SINCE THE INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON
THE GROUND AND LATCHED "ON", THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
DURING A NORMAL MISSION. IF THE INVERTER HAD TO BE RESTARTED
DURING FLIGHT, IT MIGHT BE DAMAGED OR LOST. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
ENOUGH REDUNDANT AC BUSSES TO HANDLE THE LOADS.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1386
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6385
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO INV 1 C
SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
FPCA-I
DIODE TO INV 1 C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A22CRI7
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULDHAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
THERE IS NO CURRENT FLOW THROUGH THIS DIODE AFTER INVERTER START
UP.
REFERENCES: 76BFI2B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6386 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IC OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEADANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ESS BUS IBC
2 ) F LCA - 1
3) FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IC OFF
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6F5
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BF16C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1388
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6387 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IB OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLCA-I
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IB OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6F6
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1389
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6388 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IA OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IA OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76AI 6F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULDHAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1390
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6389
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IC ON
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IC ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6F8
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6390 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IB ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
F LCA - 1
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IB ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6F9
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1392
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IA ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) FLCA-I
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s) 05-6
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS IA ON
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6FI0
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT THE CREW FROM CHANGING THE STATE OF
THE LATCHING RELAY FOR ONE PHASE OF AN AC BUS. SINCE THE
INVERTERS ARE STARTED ON THE GROUND AND LATCHED ON FOR THE
DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. ALTERNATE MEANS OF REMOVING POWER FROM AN
INVERTER EXIST IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DO SO.
REFERENCES: 76BFI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1393
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6392 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 CMD
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 CMD
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8F
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV23H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1394
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6393
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 CMD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-3
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 CMD
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8F
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS USED FOR GROUND C/O ONLY AND IS NOT POWERED
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 76BV23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6394 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1396
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6395
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1397
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6396
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-_
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC . ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1398
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6397 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76AITCR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1399
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6398 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1400
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6399
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1401
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIA1 PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1402
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118v
EPD&C
6401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI 8 CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1403
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6402 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1404
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6403 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1406
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1407
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHE;ST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYIS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 IRTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1408
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6407
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1409
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOI_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6408
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABO_ HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _LS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1410
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8_
EPD&C
6409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1411
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6410 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76AI8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1412
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76AI8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6412
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1414
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
6414
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABO;_ HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _LS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _O: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/B7
EPD&C
6415
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 2CA
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
s)
9) 05-6
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6416
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1418
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6417
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 82V76AITCR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1419
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO]%KSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIA1 PANEL
3) FLCA-1
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _LS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATI ON: 8 IV 76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1420
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6419 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 iV76AI6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO}_SHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6420 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 1A
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 1BC
RIA1 PANEL
FLCA-1
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 1A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 lV76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BF17F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1422
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6421
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1423
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 83V76AI8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1424
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6423 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6424 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 A_O: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1426
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI 7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6426
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1428
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
6427
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS IBC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH= 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6428
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS IBC
2) RIAI PANEL
3) FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76AI 6CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH.. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1430
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESSBUS IBC
RIAI PANEL
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS AS THE
INVERTER POWER IS LATCHED "ON" PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: 76BFITF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESISMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6430 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 8 IV76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1432
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6431 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #I
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7E
REPORT DATE 03/3.1/87 C-1433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6432 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8 iV76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6433
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1435
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WC,RKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1436
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6435
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STI_ESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6436
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVlN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1438
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3-
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUITE
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6438 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1440
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6439 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
3) FLCA-I
4) DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA OFF
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
8 IV76AI6CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6440
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1442
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6441 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV iC OFF
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #i
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6442 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1444
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6443 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1445
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6444 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) GSE POWER
2) PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
3) FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C OFF
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1446
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6445
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1447
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6446 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 83 V 76AI 8 CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1448
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6447
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS #2
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C OFF
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU17C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1449
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6448
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: 8 IV76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1450
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6449 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) ESS BUS IBC
3) FLCA-1
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6450 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV iC ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1452
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6451
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) GSE POWER
2) ESS BUS 2CA
3) FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82 V76A17 CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMITG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6452 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 2CA
F LCA- 2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXV IN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1454
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6453 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82 V 76AI 7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6454 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUITG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1456
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6455
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76AI 8CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6456 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1458
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6457 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IA ON
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76AI6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6458 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IB ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 8IV76AI 6CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1460
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6459 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS IBC
FLCA-I
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV IC ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76AI6CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BFI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6460
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1462
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6461 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1463
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6462 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) 0S-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 2CA
FLCA-2
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 2C ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BMI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1464
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6463 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GSE POWER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3A ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6464 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3B ON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1466
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6465
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GSE POWER
ESS BUS 3AB
FLCA-3
DIODE, ISOLATION TO INV 3C ON
05-6
cRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH. SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS USED DURING GROUND C/O ONLY AND WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BUI7B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6466 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, ROTARY 4P9P, DC INDICATOR SELECT
FAILS OPEN OR SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
F9A2 PANEL
SWITCH, ROTARY 4P9P, DC INDICATOR SELECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A9A2S2 '
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5029
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITER DC
VOLTAGES, AMPERAGES, AND SIGNAL STRENGTHS. THESE ARE NON-
CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS BECAUSE ALTERNATE METHODS OF MEASUREMENT
ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES : 76B-G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6467 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, ROTARY DP9P, AC DISPLAY SELECT
FAILS OPEN OR SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) F9A2 PANEL
2) SWITCH, ROTARY DP9P, AC DISPLAY SELECT
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A9A2 S 1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5023
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILUI_E, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITER AC
VOLTAGES. THESE ARE NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS BECAUSE ALTERNATE
METHODS OF MEASUREMENT ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG-G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1469
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6468 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS A)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #I
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDSI
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BI2H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1470
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6469
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS B)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"7)
S)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIDS 3
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0016
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76LI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6470 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS C)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ESS BUS 3AB
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) RIA1 PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (FC/MAIN BUS C)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIDS5
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0016
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76YI3H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1472
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6471 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS A)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 08-6
ESS BUS IBC
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDS2
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILtrRE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1473
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6472 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS B)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDS4
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76LI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1474
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6473 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS C)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (MAIN TIE BUS C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIDS6
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0016
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILLrRE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76YI6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1475
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6474
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #1)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ESS BUS 1BC
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
3) RiA1 PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #1)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIDS8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0032
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BG8H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6475 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #2)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 2CA
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIDS i0
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BN8H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6476
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #3)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
ESS BUS 3AB
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
INDICATOR, EVENT (INV/AC BUS #3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDSI2
MC432-0222-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BV8H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6477 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR #1)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS IBC
FPCA-I
RIAI PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDS7
MC432-0222-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BF24A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1479
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6478
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR #2)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ESS BUS 2CA
2) FPCA-2
3) RIAI PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR #2)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDS9
MC432-0222-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BM24A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6479 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR #3)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2 ) FPCA- 3
3) RIA1 PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (INVERTER PWR #3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDSII
MC432-0222-0032
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BU24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1481
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6480
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 2CA
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDS 15
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76UI3F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1482
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6481
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
RIAI PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDSI7
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76UI3D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6482 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PRI FC3)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) RIAI PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (PAYLOAD PSI FC3)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIDSI6
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76U13C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1484
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
6483
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATER, EVENT (STRUCT RTN)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
AI2 PANEL
INDICATER, EVENT (STRUCT RTN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AI2DS4
MC432-0222-0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76U4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6484
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DC VOLTMETER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) F9A2 PANEL
2) DC VOLTMETER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A9A2M2
PART NUMBER: MC432-0237-0001
B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1486
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6485
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCAMMETER
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER STATUS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) F9A2 PANEL
2) DC AMMETER
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A9A2M3
MC432-0237-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR. ALTERNATE MEANS OF STATUS
INDICATION ARE AVAILABLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76B6H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1487
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6486
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIAIA4RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76AK24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1488
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6487 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS IBC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA4R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76AK21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6488
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
g)
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3
3) RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73 AIAIA5RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76AM24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1490
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6489 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA5R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTA/4INATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES : 76AM2 IH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1491
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6490
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS A
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #i
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73 AIAIA6R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: CON_TAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76AP24H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1492
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6491
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
RIAI PANEL
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 3AB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIAIA6RI
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO
CIRCUIT. IN THE CASE OF AN OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT COULD BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES: 76AP21H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1493
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6492 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC IA
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
CURRENT SENSOR, AC IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 8 IV76A35CS 1
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BGI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1494
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6493 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC IB
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
CURRENT SENSOR, AC IB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V76A35CS2
ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76BGI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6494 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC IC
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AC BUS #i
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
3) CURRENT SENSOR, AC IC
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 81V76A35CS3
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152-0011
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BG12C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1496
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6495 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2A
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36CSI
ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BNI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6496 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2B
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36CS2
ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BNI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1498
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6497 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2C
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 2C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A36CS3
ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BN12C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6498
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3A
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 83 V76A37 CS 1
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BVI2F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1500
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
6499
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3B
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V76A37CS2
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BVI2E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1501
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6500 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3C
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) AC BUS #3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) CURRENT SENSOR, AC 3C
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A37CS3
ME449-0152-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76BV12C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6501 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-I TO APCA-4)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) CURRENT SENSOR,
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
DC (MDDA-I TO APCA-4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS4
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76B20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1503
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-I TO FPCA-I)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) CURRENT SENSOR,
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
DC (MDDA-I TO FPCA-I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CSI
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76E23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1504
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6503 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-I TO MPCA-I)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-I TO MPCA-I)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS7
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76F23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6504 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-2 TO APCA-5)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-2 TO APCA-5)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS5
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76L20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1506
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6505 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (APCA-2 TO AFT PAYLOAD)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS B
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (APCA-2 TO AFT PAYLOAD)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V76CSI0
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76L6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6506 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-2 TO FPCA-2)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS B
CURRENT SENSOR,
05-6
DC (MDDA-2 TO FPCA-2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS2
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76P23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1508
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6507 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-2 TO MPCA-2)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-2 TO MPCA-2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76CS8
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76R23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-3 TO APCA-6)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-3 TO APCA-6)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76CS6
PART NUMBER: ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76Y20C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1510
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6509 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (APCA-3 TO AFT PAYLOAD)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (APCA-3 TO AFT PAYLOAD)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
50V76CSII
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76Y6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-3 TO FPCA-3)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) CURRENT SENSOR,
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
DC (MDDA-3 TO FPCA-3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P2_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS3
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76AC23G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1512
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6511 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-3 TO MPCA-3)
FAILS TO INDICATE PROPER VALUE.
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) CURRENT SENSOR, DC (MDDA-3 TO MPCA-3)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76CS9
ME449-0152
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 76AD23D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6512 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IA TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IA TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB29
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1514
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IB TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IB TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB30
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IC TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #1
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IC TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB31
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1516
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6515 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB32
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BP13C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6516 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-_
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129 CB33
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BP12C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1518
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6517 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB34
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BP12C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1519
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB35
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BWIIB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB36
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BWIOB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB37
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
IS THE NORMAL FLIGHT CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: 76BWlOB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1522
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IA TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IA TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73A129CB29
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMALSTRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6522 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IB TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #i
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #i
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IB TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB30
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1524
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC iC TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9) os-6
AC BUS #1
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #I
MA73 C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC IC TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB31
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BH9B (42TI2H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1525
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6524 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB32
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BP13C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1526
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS #2
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB33
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BP12C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1527
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) AC BUS #2
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #2
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 2C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB34
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76BP12C (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1528
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
31xx187
EPD&C
6527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3A TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB35
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THER/4AL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76AWIIB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1529
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6528 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
AC BUS #3
INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3B TO FWD RCS VALVES)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB36
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76AWIOB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1530
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6529 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
"l)
s)
9)
i) AC BUS #3
2) INV DIST & CONT ASSY #3
3) MA73C PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (AC 3C TO FWD RCS VALVES)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
85V73AI29CB37
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO FORWARD RCS
VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL FORWARD RCS PROP TANKS AND
THEREFORE FORWARD RCS JET FIRING.
REFERENCES: 76AWIOB (42T22H)
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MAIN DC BUS A
2) ALCA-1
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76A12 IAR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48A21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1532
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
ALCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76A12 IAR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULDHAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48A21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6532 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) ALCA-1
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-1
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1534
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6533 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) ALCA-1
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STI_ESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6534 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS B
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48 BN2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1536
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6535 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BN21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6536 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO THE SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1538
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6537
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A122AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1539
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
6538 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) ALCA-3
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-1 & APCA-3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48A21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6539 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
THIS
REFERENCES: 48A21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1541
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6540 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 56V76A123AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1542
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6541 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ESS BUS 3AB
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-I & APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6542
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2) ALCA-3
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BN21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1544
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
6543 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A123AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
THIS
REFERENCES: 48BN21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6544 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ESS BUS 3AB
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI23AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1546
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6545 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ESS BUS 3AB
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
ALCA- 3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2 & APCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48 BP2 IC
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ll/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6546
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 23AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48A21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1548
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/z1/87
EPD&C
6547
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2 ) ALCA- 3
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A123AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
THIS
REFERENCES: 48A21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1549
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6548 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1550
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6549
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVERTYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76A123AR
MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE. THIS
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6550
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76A123AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BN21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1552
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8 
EPD&C
6551
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA- 3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
THIS
REFERENCES: 48BN21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6552 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANAT POWER TO SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1554
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3111187
EPD&C
6553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
ALCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR
MC477-0265-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY POWERED ON DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1555
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6554
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33AIRI9
RLR07C5101GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT ITEM AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48A21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1556
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6555
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 33AIR52
PART NUMBER: RLRO7C51OIGR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT ITEM AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISS ION/VEHICLE .
REFERENCES: 48B21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6556 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
S) 05-_
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI 33AIR30
RLR07 C510 IGR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT ITEM ANDHAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BN21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6557
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-2
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-3
RESISTOR, 5.1K TO APCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33AIR31
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5101GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A NON-CRITICAL MEASUREMENT ITEM AND HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1559
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6558 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2 ) APCA- 1
3 ) ALCA- 3
4) RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
5)
6)
V)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI23R
PART NUMBER: RLR07C7501GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR PREVENTS A FALSE SIGNAL TO THE SRB POWER
CONTROL. THIS FAILURE IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48A21A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1560
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6559 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) APCA- 1
3) ALCA- 3
4) RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A123R
PART NUMBER: RLR07C7501GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR PREVENTS A FALSE SIGNAL TO THE SRB POWER
CONTROL. THIS FAILURE IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48B21A
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1561
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6560 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
APCA-2
ALCA-3
RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23R
RLR07C7501GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR PREVENTS A FALSE SIGNAL TO THE SRB POWER
CONTROL. THIS FAILURE IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BN21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1562
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311115v
EPD&C
6561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) ALCA- 3
4) RESISTOR, 7.5K TO DC RETURN
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI23R
PART NUMBER: RLR07C7501GR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS BLEED-OFF RESISTOR PREVENTS A FALSE SIGNAL TO THE SRB POWER
CONTROL. THIS FAILURE IS NON-CRITICAL TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BP21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1563
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6562
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) APCA-1
3) RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI31AIR45
PART NUMBER: RBR56LI5001BR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF REDUNDANT POWER TO
SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48AI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1564
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6563 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUS A
APCA-I
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/IR TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI31AIR46
RBR56LI5001BR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF REDUNDANT POWER TO
SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1565
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6564 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
APCA-2
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32AIR44
RBR56LIS001BR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF REDUNDANT POWER TO
SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BNI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1566
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/e 
EPD&C
6565
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32AIR45
RBR56LI5001BR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF REDUNDANT POWER TO
SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BPI6G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6566 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 2.2K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32AIR36
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48G21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6567 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RESISTOR, 2.2K
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33AIR24
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48G21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
311118v
EPD&C
6568
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 1.8K
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132AIR35
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48G21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1570
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6569
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RESISTOR, 1.8K
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33AIR23
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48G21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1571
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6570
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 1.8K
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132AIR37
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48H21G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1572
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6571
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2 ) APCA- 3
3) RESISTOR, 1.8K
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33AIR26
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48H21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6572 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RESISTOR, 2.2K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI32AIR38
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48 H2 IG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1574
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6573 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA- 3
3) RESISTOR, 2.2K
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76A133AIR27
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DELAY OF LAUNCH.
WORST CASE
REFERENCES: 48H21C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6574
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) F6 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6AIIRI
RLR42CI201GM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N24E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1576
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6575
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS BC2
2) F6 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6AI IR2
PART NUMBER: RLR42CI201GM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6576 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) F6 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6AIIR3
PART NUMBER: RLR42CI201GM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q24E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1578
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B?
EPD&C
6577
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CONT BUS BCI
2) F6 PANEL
3) RESISTOR, 1.2K
4)
5)
6)
"I)
s)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6AIIR4
RLR42CI201GM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
SHOCK, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q24D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1579
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6578 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC27
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48A21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1580
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6579
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-3
RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76A133RPC27
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48A21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1581
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6580
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS A
APCA-I
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI31RPC3
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48AI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1582
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6581 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-I
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI31RPC3
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48AI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1583
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6582 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2 ) APCA- 3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) OS-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76A133RPC25
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48B21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1584
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/8v
EPD&C
6583
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-I
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33RPC25
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THEI_MAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48B21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6584
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS A
2) APCA-1
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI31RPC4
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1586
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
EPD&C
6585
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS A
2) APCA- 1
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI3 IRPC4
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1587
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6586 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
APCA-2
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32RPC44
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48G22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1588
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6587 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
APCA-2
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI32RPC44
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
ITEM IS NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48G22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6588 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA- 3
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC3
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48G22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1590
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6589 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-3
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC3
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
ITEM IS NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48G22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1591
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ 1 i/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6590 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-2
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI32RPC45
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48H22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1592
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/B?
EPD&C
6591
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
APCA-2
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A132RPC45
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
ITEM IS NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48H22G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1593
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6592 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN DC BUS C
APCA-3
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC4
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES:CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48H22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1594
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6593 ABORT:
ITEM: RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-3
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC4
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE AS THIS
ITEM IS NORMALLY ON DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48H22B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6594 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76A133RPC26
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BN21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1596
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6595 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC26
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BN21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1597
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6596 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A132RPC5
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BNI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1598
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
6597 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA- 2
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132RPC5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BNI8G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6598 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33RPC24
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BP21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1600
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6599 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) RPC, 20A TO APCA-2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33RPC24
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BP21F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1601
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA- 2
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI 32RPC4
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS.
LOSS OF ALL POWER TO SRB BUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BPI8H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1602
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 20A TO RELAY
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA- 2
3) RPC, 20A TO RELAY
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32RPC4
MC450-0017-2200
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/EHICLE AS THIS ITEM IS COMMANDED "ON"
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: 48BPI8H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6602 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2 ) APCA- 3
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 33 A3 CR9
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48G21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1604
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6603 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI33A3CR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48G21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132A3 CR6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48G22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1606
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6605 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
APCA-2
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32A3CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48G22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/II/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD& C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
s)
6)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132A3 CR7
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBSo
REFERENCES: 48H22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1608
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6607 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS B
2) APCA-2
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48H22F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1609
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6608 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN DC BUS C
2) APCA-3
3) DIODE TO ORB BUS C
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
s) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI33A3CRI0
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO SRB RATE
GYRO ASSY. EACH SRB HAS REDUNDANT RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CONTROL SRBS.
REFERENCES: 48H21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1610
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6609 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN DC BUS C
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
APCA-3
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 56V76AI 33A3 CRI0
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48H21B
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1611
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1612
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIEs
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1613
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6612 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48P23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1614
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6613
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/7
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48P23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1615
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6614 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1616
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6615
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: Ko SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1617
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6616 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48R23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1618
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6617 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3 ) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48R23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6618 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BJ2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1620
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6619 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BJ2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1621
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6620
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 34V73A6CR
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BF2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1622
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6621
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K° SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RSS BUS
2) F6 PANEL
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6CR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BF2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1623
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6622 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RELAY TO OIA BUS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & C
APCA-I
RELAY TO OIA BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI3 IK8
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48AI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1624
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6623 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIA BUS
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUSSES A & C
2) APCA-1
3) RELAY TO OIA BUS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 54V76AI31K8
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTA/4INATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48AI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1625
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6624 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RELAY TO OIA BUS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & C
APCA-I
RELAY TO OIA BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI3 IK9
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1626
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3111187
EPD&C
6625
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIA BUS
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
MAIN DC BUSSES A & C
APCA-I
RELAY TO OIA BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI31K9
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BITF
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1627
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6626 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIB BUS
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
MAIN DC BUSSES B & C
APCA-2
RELAY TO OIB BUS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76A132KIO
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BNI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1628
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6627 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIB BUS
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUSSES B & C
2 ) APCA- 2
3) RELAY TO OIB BUS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32KI0
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BNI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1629
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6628 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIB BUS
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUSSES B & C
2) APCA-2
3) RELAY TO OIB BUS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI32K9
MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BPI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1630
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/zz/87
EPD&C
6629
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO OIB BUS
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MAIN DC BUSSES B & C
2) APCA-2
3) RELAY TO OIB BUS
4)
5)
6)
"1)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: 55V76A132K9
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE IN THE "OPEN" POSITION WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
REDUNDANT POWER TO AN SRB BUS. LOSS OF ALL POWER TO THE SRB BUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE
SRBS DURING LAUNCH PHASE.
REFERENCES: 48BPI7F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1631
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6630
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONTROL BUSSES ABI & BC2
2) F6 PANEL
3) RELAY TO ACA #1 & ACA #3
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6KIA
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1632
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6631 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES ABI & BC2
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #1 & ACA #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6KIA
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1633
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6632 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES ABI & BC2
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6KIB
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48P23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1634
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/1118v
EPD&C
6633
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #3
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6
CONTROL BUSSES ABI & BC2
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6KIB
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48P23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1635
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6634 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #1 & ACA #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 34V73A6K3 B
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1636
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6635 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #2
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI & BCI
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S) 05-6
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K3B
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1637
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6636 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K3A
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48R23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1638
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6637 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCl
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K3A
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48R23C
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6638 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) CONT BUS AB1 & BC2
2) F6 PANEL
3) RELAY TO ACA #1 & ACA #3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K2A
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BF2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1640
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6639 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #1 & ACA #3
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS ABI & BC2
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #I & ACA #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K2A
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BF2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6640 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K2B
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BJ2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1642
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6641 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONT BUS ABI & BCI
F6 PANEL
RELAY TO ACA #i & ACA #2
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6K2B
MC455-0129
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48BJ2G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1643
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6642 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ACA #i - CHANNEL 39
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) F6 PANEL
3) ACA #i - CHANNEL 39
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 30V73A16
PART NUMBER"
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N21E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1644
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6643 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACA #3 - CHANNEL 39
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) CONT BUS BC2
2) F6 PANEL
3) ACA #3 - CHANNEL 39
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 30V73A18
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N21D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1645
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6644 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RSS LIGHTS - RANGE SAFE ARM
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CONT BUS ABI & BC2
F6A8 PANEL
RSS LIGHTS - RANGE SAFE ARM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 34V73A6A8DS53
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48N22E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1646
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
3/11/87
EPD&C
6645
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACA #i - CHANNEL 35
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI
2) F6 PANEL
3) ACA #I - CHANNEL 35
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 30V73AI6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHSHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q21E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6646 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACA #2 - CHANNEL 39
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS BC1
2) F6 PANEL
3) ACA #2 - CHANNEL 39
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 30V73A17
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q21D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1648
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6647
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RSS LIGHTS - RANGE SAFE ARM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CONT BUS ABI & BCl
2) F6A8 PANEL
3) RSS LIGHTS - RANGE SAFE ARM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 34 V73A6A8 DS 3
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ITEM IS IN A NON-CRITICAL INDICATOR CIRCUIT.
CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: 48Q22E
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1649
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6648
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) o5-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A7 $4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0061-4133
B [NA ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE MODE SWITCH MUST BE
PLACED IN "MANUAL" POSITION BEFORE THIS SWITCH CAN BE ENERGIZED.
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER MULTIPLE FAILURES IS POSSIBLE DUE TO
PREMATURE SEPERATION OF THE ET.
REFERENCES: 48BRI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1650
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6649 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7S4
ME452-0061-4133
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL OF ET SEPERATION
FUNCTION. CREW CAN OVERRIDE WITH GPC COMMAND. ET SEP FAILURE
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRI4H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1651
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6650
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A7S2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0061-4133
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS THE MODE SWITCH MUST BE
PLACED IN "MANUAL" BEFORE SRB SEP COULD OCCUR. LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF SRBS ARE SEPERATED PREMATURELY.
REFERENCES: 48BRIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1652
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
i/I TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7S2
ME452-0061-4133
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL OF SRB SEP
FUNCTION DURING A GPC INHIBIT CONDITION. IF THE CREW COULD NOT
REMOVE THE INHIBIT CONDITION, THIS WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.HRO
REFERENCES: 48BRIOH
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1653
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/ii/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6652 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
C3A7 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A7S 3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7352
B [NA ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN ET SEP FUNCTION.
IF MANUAL ET SEP WERE REQUIRED, IT COULD NOT BE PERFORMED
RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1654
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
C3A7 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7S3
ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS A PUSHBUTTON MUST BE PUSHED
TO INITIATE ET SEP. A SECOND FAILURE COULD INITIATE PREMATURE ET
SEP RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1655
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
FAILS OFF - SHORTS POLE TO POLE OR GND
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
C3A7 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK (ET SEP SLCT)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7S3
ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN ET SEP FUNCTION.
IF MANUAL ET SEP WERE REQUIRED, IT COULD NOT BE PERFORMED
RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRI7G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1656
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6655 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
1/1 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7SI
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL SRB SEP FUNCTION DURING A
GPC INHIBIT CONDITION. IF THE CREW COULD NOT FLY OUT OF THE
INHIBIT REGION, SRB SEP WILL NOT OCCUR LEADING TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRIOG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1657
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) C3A7 PANEL
2) SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3ATSI
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS A PUSHBUTTON WOULDHAVE TO
BE PUSHED TO INITIATE MANUAL SRB SEP. A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CAUSE PREMATURE SRB SEP RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRIOG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1658
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
FAILS OFF - SHORTS POLE TO POLE OR GND
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
C3A7 PANEL
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP SLCT)
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A7SI
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MANUAL SRB SEP FUNCTION DURING A
GPC INHIBIT CONDITION. IF THE CREW COULD NOT FLY OUT OF THE
INHIBIT REGION, SRB SEP WILL NOT OCCUR LEADING TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 48BRIOG
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1659
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6658 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A TO ET TUMBLE ARM
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
MAIN DC BUS B
MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2
APCA-5
ALCA-2
FUSE, 3A TO ET TUMBLE ARM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22F
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD ONLY CAUSE LOSS OF THE ET TUMBLING FUNCTION
AFTER SEP. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION
REFERENCES: 4 8BMI9G
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1660
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6659 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:.
1) MAIN DC BUS B
2) ALCA-2
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ET TUMBLE CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 48BM20F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1661
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6660 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2 ) ALCA- 2
3) HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE "ON" WOULD
ENERGIZE THE ET TUMBLE VALVE PREMATURELY WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: 48BM20F
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1662
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 I/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6661 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN DC BUS B
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI22AR
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ET TUMBLE CIRCUIT.
ON CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES: 48BM20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1663
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
s) 05-6
MAIN DC BUS B
ALCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET TUMBLE CKT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI 22AR
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE "ON" WOULD
ENERGIZE THE ET TUMBLE VALVE PREMATURELY WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: 48BM20D
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1664
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
6663 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - CRITICAL COMMANDS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IN] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR COMMAND CIRCUITS
FOR MEC FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY OF MEC TO INITIATE STAGING AND SEP.
REFERENCES: 76DAI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 6664 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - CRITICAL COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ N ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI3
MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURE OPERATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. A SECOND FAILURE
COULD CAUSE A PREMATURE INITIATION OF A CRITICAL OR NON-CRITICAL
FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76DAI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1666
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
6665 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - CRITICAL COMMANDS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IN ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI4
MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR COMMAND CIRCUITS
FOR MEC FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY OF MEC TO INITIATE STAGING AND SEP.
REFERENCES: 76DA7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1667
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
6666 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - CRITICAL COMMANDS
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) os-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ N ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI4
MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURE OPERATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. A SECOND FAILURE
COULD CAUSE A PREMATURE INITIATION OF A CRITICAL OR NON-CRITICAL
FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76DA7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1668
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/1 i/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6667 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - NON-CRITICAL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #I - NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ N] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI3
MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR MONITOR CIRCUITS
FOR MEC FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER FOR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
REFERENCES: 76DAI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1669
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6668 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #I - NON-CRITICAL
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #i - NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B IN] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 54V76A13
PART NUMBER: MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURE OPERATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. A SECOND FAILURE
COULD CAUSE A PREMATURE INITIATION OF A CRITICAL OR NON-CRITICAL
FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76DAI9H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1670
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6669 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - NON-CRITICAL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ N] C [ P]
LOCATION: 55V76AI4
PART NUMBER: MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR MONITOR CIRCUITS
FOR MEC FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER FOR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
REFERENCES: 76DA7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/11/87
EPD&C
6670
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - NON-CRITICAL
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 - NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9) 05-6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [N] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76AI4
MC450-0016-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WOULD CAUSE DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURE OPERATION OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. A SECOND FAILURE
COULD CAUSE A PREMATURE INITIATION OF A CRITICAL OR NON-CRITICAL
FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 76DA7H
REPORT DATE 03/31/87 C-1672
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
5007
5008
5017
5018
5020
5022
5023
5024
5025
5028
5030
5047
5048
5053
5056
5059
5060
5061
5062
5064
5065
5066
5068
5070
5082
5084
5085
5086
5087
5090
5091
FUSE, 2OOA TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
1
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
1
FUSE, 20OA TO APCA-4
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS
MAIN A)
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 15OA TO DC TIE BUS
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS
A F/C PWR)
FUSE, 2OA TO ESS BUS 1BC
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 1)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE A)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE A)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO MN A
CONT BUS PWR, ESS BUS SOURCE 3AB,ESS
BUS SOURCE 2CA
FUSE, 5A TO RMS PWR (FUSE
1),RMS HTRS (RESISTORS) & RJDA
MANF DRS (FUSES 9 & 12)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN A MID 1)
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-1
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-1
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-1
RPC, 5A (FMCA-1 PWR CONT)
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
1
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS 'OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
D-1
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
MDAC-ID
5092
5093
5096
5097
5098
5103
5104
5105
5106
5107
5109
5110
5112
5114
5115
5118
5125
5126
5136
5139
5140
5141
5142
5143
5144
5146
5147
5148
5151
5152
5155
5176
5178
5180
ITEM
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
1
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
1
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-1
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-1)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN A FWD 1)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT
ASSY ol
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT
ASSY e3
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-1
FUSE, IOOA TO ALCA-1
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN A AFT 1)
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-1)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN A MID 3)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
FUSE, 20OA TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
2
FUSE, 20OA TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
2
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 2)
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 2CA
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 15OA TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 16OA TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
FUSE, 2OOA TO APCA-5
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS
MAIN B)
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS
B F/C PWR)
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS
C F/C PWR)
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS
MAIN C)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE B)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO TRANSFER
D-2
MDAC-ID
5181
5188
5190
5191
5192
5193
5195
5196
5205
5206
5208
5209
5210
5213
5214
5215
5216
5217
5220
5221
5223
5224
5226
5228
5229
5231
5235
5237
5238
5241
5242
5243
5244
5245
5246
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE B)
FUSE, 8OA
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, IOA TO RMS PWR & RJDA
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT
BUS PWR MN B, ESS BUSSES 1BC &
3AB
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-2)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B FWD 2)
FUSE, 15OA TO FPCA-2
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2
RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
2
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
2
FUSE, 15OA TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
2
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B MID 1)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B MID 2)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B MID 3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B MID 4)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT
ASSY e2
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT
ASSY #3
FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT
ASSY _4
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-2
FUSE, IOOA TO ALCA-2
FAILURE MODE
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FALLS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS oPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-3
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MDAC-ID ITEM $
5248
5249
5251
5253
5254
5255
5256
5274
5275
5276
5277
5278
5279
5280
5281
5282
5283
5284
5285
5302
5316
5317
5320
5321
5322
5323
5324
5325
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
SWITCH, TOGGLESPST (MCA LOGIC
MN B AFT 2)
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX
BUS - MPCA-1)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX
BUS - MPCA-2)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN
BUS - MPCA-2)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN
BUS - MPCA-1)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOADCAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOADCAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO
PAYLOAD CAB N)
DIODE, SOLAT ON 35A (TO P/L
PWR KILL - FC#3)
FUSE, 15OA TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
3 (PAYLOAD)
FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
3 (PAYLOAD)
FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
FUSE, 20OA TO PAYLOAD
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FALLS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FALLS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-4
MDAC-I D
_mm .....
5330
5333
5336
5337
5346
5347
5357
5358
5359
5361
5362
5364
5369
5370
5377
5395
5396
5399
5400
5401
5402
5407
5410
5411
5419
5421
5422
5423
5426
5427
5430
5431
5432
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC
RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC
RETURN FROM P/L BAY)
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3
STRUCTURE RETURN)
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3
STRUCTURE RETURN)
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
3
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY
3
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 3)
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6
FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 2OOA TO DC TIE BUS
FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 3AB
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE C)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS
TIE C)
FUSE, 8OA TO AFT P/L MN C
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT
BUS MAIN C, ESS BUSSES 1BC &
2CA
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
FUSE, 35A
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-3)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN C FWD 3)
FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-3
FUSE, 15OA TO FPCA-3
RPC, 5A (FMCA-3 PWR CONT)
FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN C MID 2)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OFF
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
D-5
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MDAC-ID ITEM FA LURE MODE
5434
5438
5439
5440
5442
5444
5445
5446
5448
5449
5451
5453
5455
5456
5477
5480
5481
5484
5486
5487
5489
5492
5494
5495
5501
5509
5510
5512
5514
5515
5516
5517
5518
552O
SWITCH, TOGGLESPST (MCA LOGIC
MN C MID 4)
FUSE, 35A TO H2/02 HTR CONT
ASSY _1
FUSE, 35A TO H2/02 HTR CONT
ASSY _2
FUSE, 50A TO H2/02 HTR CONT
ASSY e4
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
FUSE, 150A TO APCA-3
FUSE, IOOA TO ALCA-3
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC
MN C AFT 3)
RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
1BC)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS
SOURCE MAIN B/C)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
1BC)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
1BC)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
1BC)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
1BC)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIA1
PANEL - ESS BUS 1BC)
FUSE, IOA TO ESS BUS 1BC
FUSE, IOA TO ESS BUS 1BC
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-4
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-1
FUSE, IOA TO FPCA-1 & FLCA1
FUSE, IOA TO R15 PANEL
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-1 (MPS)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD
VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS
SOURCE MAIN C/A)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
2CA)
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-6
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MDAC-ID ITEM FA LURE MODE
5521
5542
5545
5546
5549
5550
5551
5554
5557
5558
5559
5572
5573
5574
5576
5578
5579
5580
5581
5582
5583
5584
5585
5586
5588
5590
5593
5596
5597
5600
5601
56.02
5603
5605
5608
5609
5610
5611
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
2CA)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO R1A1
PANEL - ESS BUS 2CA)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
2CA)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
2CA)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
2CA)
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA
FUSE, 1OA TO ESS BUS 2CA
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-5
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-2
FUSE, 1OA TO FPCA-2 & FLCA-2
FUSE, 10A TO 013 & R15 PANELS
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-2 (MPS)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD
VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD
VLV LOGIC GRP 1/3)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-4)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
3AB)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
3AB)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS
3AB)
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIA1
PANEL - ESS BUS 3AB)
FUSE, IOA TO ESS BUS 3AB
FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 3AB
FUSE, 7.5A
FUSE, 15A TO APCA-6
FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-3
FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-3 & FLCA-3
FUSE, 10A TO 013 PANEL
FUSE, 7.5A
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FALLS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-7
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5621
5626
5627
5628
5683
5684
5685
5693
5694
5695
5696
5697
5698
5699
5700
5701
5702
5703
5704
5715
5717
5719
5721
5723
5725
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ITEM
FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-3 (MPS)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
3AB)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS
3AB)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS
SOURCE MAIN A/B)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT
BUSSES AB & CA RESET)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT
BUSSES AB & BC RESET)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO CONT
BUSSES CA & BC RESET)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA1
D ODE,
BUS AB2
D ODE,
BUS AB2
D ODE,
BUS CA2
D ODE,
BUS CA2
D ODE,
BUS AB3
D ODE,
BUS AB3
DIODE,
BUS CA3
DIODE,
BUS CA3
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
CA1 & AB1)
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
CA2 & AB2)
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
CA3 & AB3)
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
BC1 & AB1)
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
BC2 & AB2)
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE
BC3 & AB3)
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
(CONT BUS
(CONT BUS
(CONT BUS
(CONT BUS
(CONT BUS
(CONT BUS
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
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5727
5729
5731
5739
5740
5741
5742
5743
5744
5745
5746
5747
5748
5749
5750
5769
5770
5771
5772
5773
5774
5775
5776
5777
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ITEM
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS
BC1 & CA1)
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS
BC2 & CA2)
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (CONT BUS
BC3 & CA3)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC3)
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC3)
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB3)
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS AB3)
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA1
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA1
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC1
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC1
DIODE, SOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA2
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA3)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-9
MDAC-ID
5778
5779
5780
5788
5789
5790
5791
5792
5793
5794
5795
5796
5797
5798
5799
5800
5801
5802
5803
5804
5805
5806
5807
5808
5809
5810
5811
5812
5813
5814
5815
5816
5817
5818
5819
5820
5821
5822
5823
5824
5825
5826
5827
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE
FUSE,
FUSE,
FUSE,
FUSE,
FUSE,
FUSE,
FUSE,
ITEM
_mDm
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA3)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC3)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS BC3)
FUSE, 1A TO P/L RETENTION
LATCHES SYS 1
FUSE, 1A TO P/L RETENTION
LATCHES SYS 2
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB1
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB2
FUSE, 5A TO CONT BUS AB3
FUSE 5A TO CONT BUS BC1
5A TO CONT BUS BC2
5A TO CONT BUS BC3
5A TO CONT BUS CA1
5A TO CONT BUS CA2
5A TO CONT BUS CA3
1A TO MMCA-1 & 2
1A TO MMCA-1 & 2
1A TO MMCA-2
1A TO MMCA-2
1A TO MMCA-2 & 1
1A TO MMCA-2 & 1
1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
FUSE, 1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
FUSE, 1A TO MMCA-4 & 3
SOLATION 3A
SOLATION 3A
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
D ODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
DIODE,
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
SOLAT
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
ON 3A
SWITCH, TOGGLE 4PDT (P/L BAY
MECH PWR SYS 1)
FAILURE MODE
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN OR
SHORTS TO CASE
D-10
MDAC-ID
5830
5867
5868
5869
5913
5916
5917
5941
5942
5943
5966
5968
5970
5972
5980
5982
5984
5986
5988
5989
5990
5991
5992
5993
5994
5995
6032
6033
6034
6092
6095
6096
6104
6105
6106
6144
6147
6148
6151
6152
6155
6156
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
SWITCH, TOGGLE4PDT (P/L BAY
MECH PWR SYS 2)
FUSE, 8OA 1"O INV 1 A
FUSE, 80A 1"O INV 1 B
FUSE, 80A TO INV 1 C
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 A
RESET)
DIODE, BLOC:KING 1A (TO 1 B
RESET)
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 1 C
RESET)
FUSE, 3A TC) AC BUS 1 A
FUSE, 3A TC) AC BUS 1 B
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 1 C
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-1
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-1
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-3
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-1
RELAY TO PLBD AC1
RELAY TO PLBD AC1
RELAY TO PLBD AC1
RELAY TO PLBD AC1
RELAY, 4P "ro PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P "ro PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P "to PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P 'TO PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P 'TO PLBM-AC1
RELAY, 4P 'TO PLBM-AC1
FUSE, 8OA TO INV 2 A
FUSE, 8OA TO INV 2 B
FUSE, 8OA TO INV 2 C
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 A
RESET)
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 B
RESET)
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 2 C
RESET)
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 A
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 B
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 2 C
CIRCU T BREAKER TO FMCA-2
CIRCU T BREAKER TO MMCA-1
CIRCU T BREAKER TO MMCA-2
CIRCU T BREAKER TO MMCA-3
CIRCU T BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CIRCU T BREAKER TO AMCA-2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN OR
SHORTS TO CASE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
SHORTS
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
SHORTS
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
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6157
6158
6159
6160
6163
6164
6165
6166
6167
6168
6171
6172
6173
6174
6175
6212
6213
6214
6273
6275
6277
6302
6303
6304
6328
6330
6332
6334
6336
6338
6340
6342
6344
6345
6346
6347
6348
6349
6350
6351
6352
6353
6354
6355
6362
6364
APPENDIX 0 (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
RELAY TO PLBD AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC2
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 A
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 B
FUSE, 80A TO INV 3 C
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 3 A
RESET)
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 3 B
RESET)
DIODE, BLOCKING 1A (TO 3 C
RESET)
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 A
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 B
FUSE, 3A TO AC BUS 3 C
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO FMCA-3
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-2
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO MMCA-4
CIRCUIT BREAKER TO AMCA-3
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
RELAY TO PLBD AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY= 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RELAY, 4P TO PLBM-AC3
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC el)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC el)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC e2)
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MEC e2)
RPC, IOA TO MEC e2
RPC, IOA TO MEC e2
FAILURE MODE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
SHORTS
SHORTS
SHORTS
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS CLOSED
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
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6366
6368
6370
6373
6374
6377
6378
6530
6532
6534
6536
6538
6540
6542
6544
6546
6548
6550
6552
6562
6563
6564
6565
6586
6588
6590
6592
6602
6604
6606
6608
6622
6623
6624
6625
6626
6627
6628
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
RPC, IOA TO MEC ol
RPC, 1OA TO MEC el
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA1)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS CA2)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT
BUS.CA3)
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
DIODE, ISOLATION 12A
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I TO APCA-1
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-1
& APCA-3
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-1
& APCA-3
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2
& APCA-3
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE II TO APCA-2
& APCA-3
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE II
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE II
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE II
HYBR D DRIVER TYPE V TO HYBRID
DRIVER TYPE I I
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
RESISTOR, 15K TO ALCA-3
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
RPC, 2OA TO ORB BUS C
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
RPC, 20A TO ORB BUS C
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
DIODE TO ORB BUS C
RELAY TO OIA BUS
RELAY TO OIA BUS
RELAY TO OIA BUS
RELAY TO OIA BUS
RELAY TO OIB BUS
RELAY TO OIB BUS
RELAY TO OIB BUS
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OPEN
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA LS OFF
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
FA
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OFF
LS OFF
LS OFF
LS OFF.
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS OPEN
LS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
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6629
6648
6649
6650
6651
6652
6653
6654
6655
6656
6657
6660
6662
6664
6666
6668
6670
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
ITEM
RELAY TO OIB BUS
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (ET SEP)
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
SWITCH, PUSHBUTTON (SRB SEP)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK
(ET SEP SLCT)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK
(ET SEP SLCT)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P LEVER LOCK
(ET SEP SLCT)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP
SLCT)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP
SLCT)
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2P (SRB SEP
SLCT)
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET
TUMBLE CKT
HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III TO ET
TUMBLE CKT
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER _1 -
CRITICAL COMMANDS
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER #2 -
CRITICAL COMMANDS
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER _1 -
NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER e2 -
NON-CRITICAL COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
FAILS ON
FAILS OFF
FAILS ON
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
FA LS ON
FA LS OFF - SHORTS POLE
TO POLE OR GND
FA LS OFF
FA LS ON
FA LS OFF - SHORTS POLE
TO POLE OR GND
FA LS ON
FA LS ON
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
INADVERTENT TRANSFER
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I _ Independent Orbiter Assessment
l _ Analysis of the EPD&C Subsystem
i. 0 _XECUTIVE SUMMARY
in_
l /June T986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of I/ the Failure Modes and Effects An FMEA) and Critical Items /
---f_or Przparati=n o_ _M_ an8 rTL L IC October 190Z.- The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (_n_Y _ the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C> hardware.
The EPD&C hardware performs the functions of distributing,
sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting,
distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 4.00 Hz AC power
to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the
Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. .T4_e_E_D&C _ub&_L_,
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Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the fourteen subdivisions of the EPD&C. A s_unmary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
_ajn_m_
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F) I
[ Criticality : I i/i I 2/IRI 2/2 I 3/iRl 3/:;.RI 3/3 i TOTAL i
I I i I i I I I I
i Number : i 12 i 136 i - i 478 i 6!) I 976 i 1671 [
+ ....... +
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
i Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F) i
I ....... I
i Criticality : 1 i/i I 2/IRI 2/2 I 3/IRa 3/2RI TOTAL I
I I I i I I I I
[ Number : [ 12 I 136 i - i 292 I 28 i 468 i
+
Of the one thousand six hundred seventy-one (1671) failure modes
analyzed, nine (9) single failures were determined to result in
loss of crew or vehicle. Three (3) single failures unique to
intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of one hundred thirty-six (136) single failures occurred. Six
(6) of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two
pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket
Booster separation. The other six (6) criticality 1/1 failures
are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5,
and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) i,
2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System
(MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) clrcuits.
